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Abstract
We formulate three famous, descriptive essays of C.N. Parkinson on bureaucratic inefficiency
in a quantifiable and dynamical socio-physical framework. In the first model we show how the
use of recent opinion formation models for small groups can be used to understand Parkinson’s
observation that decision making bodies such as cabinets or boards become highly inefficient once
their size exceeds a critical ’Coefficient of Inefficiency’, typically around 20. A second observation of
Parkinson – which is sometimes referred to as Parkinson’s Law – is that the growth of bureaucratic
or administrative bodies usually goes hand in hand with a drastic decrease of its overall efficiency. In
our second model we view a bureaucratic body as a system of a flow of workers, which enter, become
promoted to various internal levels within the system over time, and leave the system after having
served for a certain time. Promotion usually is associated with an increase of subordinates. Within
the proposed model it becomes possible to work out the phase diagram under which conditions
bureaucratic growth can be confined. In our last model we assign individual efficiency curves to
workers throughout their life in administration, and compute the optimum time to send them to
old age pension, in order to ensure a maximum of efficiency within the body – in Parkinson’s words
we compute the ’Pension Point’ .
PACS numbers: 87.23.Ge, 05.90.+m
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I. INTRODUCTION
C.N. Parkinson has studied socio-dynamical systems with special focus on bureaucratic
and administrative bodies. In his famous book [1] he comprises 10 essays which give detailed
descriptions of microscopic mechanisms leading to macroscopic phenomena like exponential
growth of administrations, impact on the size of executive councils on efficient decision-
making, and the relationship between the age of retirement and a company’s vital promotion
scheme. These essays are not quantitative, however, the description of these microscopic
mechanisms is so clear and brilliant, that they can be easily cast into dynamical models.
We pick three of these essays which are especially well suited for this purpose.
In the first essay (chapter 4 in [1]), Parkinson conjectured on historical evidence that there
is a characteristic group size beyond which the ability of this group for efficient decision-
making, i.e. the finding of consensus, is considerably diminished. The empirical findings
based on government size, found in the 1950s [1], are still valid today to a large extend [15].
By proposing an opinion formation model for small groups we provide an understanding for
this hypothesis through the existence of finite size effects which lead to this characteristic
size (’Coefficient of Inefficiency’) of decision-making bodies.
In the second essay (chapter 1 in [1]), we formalize the so-called ’Parkinson’s Law’. We
propose dynamical equations for his model of bureaucratic growth and solve them explicitly.
As the main result we derive the phase diagram of this model for the macroscopic evolution
of an administrative body. One phase corresponds to an exponentially growing body, the
other to a shrinking one.
The third essay (chapter 10 in [1]), studies the interrelation between the age of retirement
and promotion schemes with the motif force to ensure the presence of career opportunities
and prevent the lack thereof, a phenomenon also known as ’Prince Charles Syndrome’. There
we show the existence of a unique maximum for the efficiency of a bureaucratic body at the
optimum life-time of a worker in the system. Given a promotion scheme and the hierarchy
in the system, the optimal age of retirement can be computed.
This paper is organized as follows: in Section II we review work on the relationship
between the size of a decision-making body and its efficiency [2]. In Section III we propose
and solve the dynamical equations for a model of an administrative body which evolves
according to Parkinson’s Law. The question when an official within such a body should
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retire to ensure a maximum of overall efficiency of the administrative body is left for the
final Section IV. We interpret our results and conclude in Section V.
II. THE COEFFICIENT OF INEFFICIENCY
Parkinson discovered what he called the life cycle of a cabinet. He studied the membership
of Britain’s highest executive council, the cabinet, spanning 700 years, from 1257 to 1955.
He found that an initially small council steadily increased in size, until growing beyond a
size of 20, shortly after which it was superseded by a new council with the same fate. The
British cabinet went five times through this life cycle within the aforementioned timespan.
He also lists the cabinet sizes of his time revealing that cabinets beyond a size of 21 are
only found in communistic countries. He concludes that it is critical for cabinets to have
memberships below this characteristic size (21) for efficient decision-making within this
council (the ’Coefficient of Inefficiency’). His explanation for this phenomenon was that as
group size increases the influence of individual members decreases (not only because there
are simply more of them, but also because the group is more likely to dissociate into separate
subgroups). The less influence a member bears, the more easily new members are admitted
to the council which in turn decreases their influence further. In the following we ask if
similar observations can be made with today’s data on cabinets. We then propose a model
for opinion formation in small groups whose dependence on the group-size nicely resembles
the transition conjectured by Parkinson.
Governmental Efficiency and Cabinet Size
We compiled a database of cabinet sizes N , for 197 countries and self-governing territories
with data drawn from the CIA [3]. The results reported in [2] showed that the majority of
cabinet sizes falls in the range between 13 and 20 [16]. To compare cabinet size with its effi-
ciency we made use of indicators provided by the United Nations Development Programme
[4] and the indicator Political Stability (PS) provided by the World Bank [5]. We processed
the data by computing the average of the indicator values for each N and tested against
the hypothesis that there exists no correlation between them, see Fig. 1. We find negative
correlations between the cabinet size and the Human Development Indicator (HDI), see
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FIG. 1: Cabinet sizeN versus (a) the Human Development Indicator and (b) and Political Stability.
The p−values indicate the high significance of negative correlation between them. We computed the
average indicator value for each N and binned them with intervals of two; errors were calculated
by Gaussian error propagation. The green line is a linear least squares fit which intersects the
median of the respective distributions at around 20.
Fig. 1(a), and between cabinet size and a series of governance indicators from [5] revealing
that larger cabinets coincide with a more unstable political climate, Fig. 1(b). A linear
fit to the data reveals that the value of N separating above-average ranking countries from
below-average ranking ones is found around 20 for each indicator. For more details see [2].
Opinion Formation in Small Groups
Decision-making in small groups can be cast into a dynamical opinion formation model
[6]. Each member of the committee is represented as a node in a network and holds a binary
opinion, say 0/1. Each node has a connectivity k which is the number of undirected links
to other nodes, representing a social influence (interactions, such as discussions) two agents
exert upon each other [7, 8]. Each node shares k undirected links with other nodes. Thus for
N > k + 1 the graph is not fully connected and nodes appear which are not directly linked.
We assume the total network to be connected, i.e. there exist no disjoint subnetworks.
According to Parkinson groups such as cabinets are typically highly clustered. Therefore
a sensitive choice for the fixed network architecture of our model is a small-world network,
which has already been shown to be of paramount importance in modelling social interactions
[9]. Each node is connected with its k nearest neighbors, then with probability e each link is
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FIG. 2: Dynamics of the opinion formation process in groups of three different sizes (N =
15, 25, 35). Each individual is a cell with binary opinion (black or white). For each value of
N we show 4 independent update-runs, all starting with the same initial configurations and the
same network. In each run we show the first four time steps 0,1,2,3, where time 0 corresponds to
the initial configuration. Line 1 is obtained by the iterative application of the opinion formation
protocol on the initial configuration in a random sequence of updates. The subsequent lines (2,3)
are obtained analogously. The actual sequence is seen to play an important role for the final state
at time 3. We show two different trajectories leading to consensus (everything white or black at
time 3) or dissensus (mixed colors, i.e. opposing factions) for each size N .
randomly rewired. As a dynamical rule governing the interactions between connected agents
we chose a majority rule [10, 11, 12, 13] with a predefined threshold h ∈ (0.5, 1], see [14].
When the update is carried out random sequentially, i.e. within one iteration each node is
updated one after the other in a random order, this yields exactly the opinion formation
model studied in [15]. Here a node adopts the state of the majority of its k neighbors only
if this majority lies above h, otherwise the node keeps its previous internal state.
To anticipate the evolution of a system specified by the above characteristics, consider Fig.
2, where four different runs for three choices of cabinet size N are shown. We used parameter
settings k = 8, h = 0.6, e = 0.1. The system is initiated with a random configuration of
internal states (lowest rows, labelled 0), each cell represents one agent in the network with
a color corresponding to his binary opinion. The above rows are derived after updating
each node once in a random sequential order. It becomes apparent that this model favors
the forming of clusters, i.e. neighboring nodes tend to share the same opinion – coalitions
emerge. Note that for each of the four runs we start with the same initial conditions, thus the
difference of the final states is solely due to the random sequential update. Further we see
that the final states (rows number 3) can be characterized whether they consist of agents
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FIG. 3: D (N) for four different settings of the model parameters (k, h, e). Setting (8, 0.6, 0.1)
D (N) is shown by the blue squares. For N < 10 we obtain always consensus here, except the
N = 8 case. We then find two regimes approximated by a linear fit and separated by a shaded
area, where we conjecture the ’Coefficient of Inefficiency’ to lie. Decreasing the connectivity of the
group‘s network, parameter setting (6, 0.6, 0.1), red left triangles, shifts the position of the shaded
transition area and increases the tendency toward dissensus. Adjusting the threshold such that we
recover the pure majority rule, (8, 0.5 + ǫ, 0.1), green right triangles, has no impact on D (N) due
to our choice of k, except that we do not find the ’Charles I’ scenario in this case. Lowering e and
therefore increasing the spatial correlations in the network hardens the finding of consensus too,
as can be seen from the settings (8, 0.6, 0.05) (magenta diamonds).
with the same opinion (consensus) or whether there are at least two factions of opposite
opinions (dissensus).
The question whether efficient decision-making in the group is possible or not translates
into the question how likely the group evolves into final state of consensus or dissensus. We
define dissensus D (N) as the order parameter of the model: let Si be the initial population
of nodes with internal state 0 and Sf the final population in this state. We then have
D (N) ≡
〈
Θ
(
1−
max (Sf , N − Sf )
N
)〉
Si
, (1)
with Θ (x) being the Heaviside step function and 〈·〉Si the average over all possible initial
conditions. Si is drawn with uniform probability from (0, 1, . . .N). Accordingly, the opinions
are randomly assigned to the individual nodes. D (N) gives the expectation value of a final
state without consensus and measures the group’s proneness to end up in dispute. We
show D (N) for four different parameter settings in Fig. 3. For each curve we find three
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distinct regimes. In the region where the network is fully connected we always find consensus
(except the notable N = 8 case, to which we will return later). Then we find two regions
of approximately linear growth. Between these, the shaded areas in the plot, the slope
considerably decreases. We further see that for lower values of k, D (N) increases (because
of the emergence of disconnected clusters) and for less shortcuts, i.e. lower values of e and
therefore higher spatial correlations D (N) also increases. Both mechanisms, lower k and e,
favor the emergence of clusters.
The decrease of the slope after N has passed the sizes of the shaded areas can be nat-
urally understood as a finite size effect present for small groups. This effect is constituted
by the considerably increased likelihood to form coalitions in this model, is in one-to-one
correspondence to the diminishing influence of the assembly’s members. Since the gap be-
tween two values for D (N) can be understood as the resistance to the cabinet’s equivalent
expansion, the dynamics proposed by Parkinson and the existence of a characteristic size
for its functioning, the ’Coefficient of Inefficiency’, are both reproduced by the behavior of
D (N) in Fig. 3.
Parkinson has noted that there were no cabinets found with eight members. This is still
the case today. Our findings show that there is good reason to avoid this number, at least
for certain parameter values, see Fig. 3. Historically there exists a famous exception: Eight
was the number preferred by King Charles I for his Committee of State. And look what
happened to him! [17].
III. PARKINSON’S LAW
The famous sentence ’Work expands as to fill the resources available for its completion’
was a guiding principle for Parkinson when he demonstrated that the growth of the admin-
istrative staff of the British navy stood in no relation to the work that actually had to be
administered. For example, in the peacetime periods between 1935 and 1954 (i.e. excluding
the even stronger growing staff during World War II) the staff of the Colonial office steadily
increased by an average percentage of 6% a year, from 372 to 1661, while the colonial ter-
ritories in the same timespan shrunk dramatically. The same figure of 6% turns out if one
traces the growth of the dockyard staff of the British navy between 1914 and 1928. During
this timespan the admiralty officials increased by around 80%, while the ships in commission
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decreased from 62 to 20. Parkinson suggested to explain this growth by the ’principle’ that
an official tries to maximize subordinates, not rivals. This is nowadays soetimes referred to
as Parkinson’s Law. That is, if an official gets promoted (happening with probability p) this
is in real terms carried out by allocating r subordinates to him.
We now present a model to understand Parkinson’s intuition for administrative growth.
We derive the growth rate λ explicitly, depending on the model parameters r and p. Further
we introduce a drop-out rate γ, the probability for an official to quit his job, as well as the
age of retirement τR, which gives the typical administrative life-span. Consider γ and τR to
be fixed and measurable. The question to determine τR is left to the next section.
Let us denote the number of promoted staff that has served for τ years at time t, n+τ (t)
and the number of subordinate staff n−τ (t), analogously. Let the age of retirement be
τR, the time between entry and end of service. We then have for the number of total
promoted/subordinate staff N± (t) =
∑τR
τ=0 n
±
τ (t). Further, let pτ be the probability to get
promoted after τ years of service, r the average number of subordinates one gets appointed
if promoted, and γ the drop-out rate. We then arrive at the update equations
n+τ (t + 1) = n
+
τ (t) (1− γ) + pτn
−
τ (t) , (2)
n−τ (t + 1) = n
−
τ (t) (1− γ − pτ ) , (3)
n−0 (t + 1) = r
τR−1∑
τ=0
pτn
−
τ (t) . (4)
Assume that no official enters at a promoted level, n+0 (t) = 0. By introducing p as the
average probability to get promoted, p =
∑
τR−1
τ=0
pτn
−
τ (t)∑
τR−1
τ=0
n−τ (t)
, Eq. 4 takes the form
n−0 (t + 1) = rp
(
N− (t)− n−τR (t)
)
. (5)
Combining this with Eq. 3 in the definition of N− (t) we obtain the update equation for the
total number of subordinate staff,
N− (t + 1) = (1− γ + (r − 1) p)
[
N− (t)− n−τR (t)
]
= (1− γ + (r − 1) p) (1− q−)N
− (t) , (6)
where we define q− =
n±τR(t)
N−(t)
and assume that the growth of the system is stationary. Using
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Eq. 2 in the definition for N+ (t) =
∑τR
τ=0 n
+
τ (t) we get the update equation for the total
number of promoted staff as,
N+ (t + 1) = (1− γ)
[
N+ (t)− n+τR (t)
]
+ p
[
N− (t)− n−τR (t)
]
= (1− γ) (1− q+)N
+ (t) + p (1− q−)N
− (t) , (7)
where q+ =
n±τR(t)
N+(t)
. We define a ≡ (1− γ + (r − 1) p) (1− q−), b ≡ p (1− q−) and c ≡
(1− γ) (1− q+) to rewrite Eqs. 6, 7 in matrix form

 N− (t+ 1)
N+ (t+ 1)

 =

 a 0
b c



 N− (t)
N+ (t)

 . (8)
To obtain q− let us rewrite Eq. 6 as N
− (t + 1) = aN− (t). From Eq. 3 we find that
n−τR (t) = n
−
0 (t− τR) (1− γ − pτ )
τR . Here we can plug in Eq. 4, iterate N− (t− τR − 1)
forward for τR+1 times and divide by an overall N
− (t) to obtain a self-consistent equation
for q−,
q− (1− q−)
τR =
rp (1− γ − p)τR
[1− γ + (r − 1) p]τR+1
. (9)
For q+ we start with Eq. 2 and iterate it τR times backward. Making use of Eqs. 3 and 4
and using n+0 (t) = 0 we get
n+τR (t) = p
τR−1∑
t=0
n−τ (t− τR + τ) (1− γ)
τR−τ+1 . (10)
Applying Eq. 3 for τ times we obtain a sum which can be written as an incomplete geometric
series leading to
n+τR (t) = p (1− γ)
τR+1 n−0 (t− τR)
(
1−γ−p
1−γ
)τR
− 1
1−γ−p
1−γ
− 1
. (11)
Combining Eq. 4 and Eq. 6 we get the helpful relation n−0 (t− τR) =
rp (1− q−) a
−τR−1N− (t) Plug this in Eq. 11 and divide both sides by N+ (t) to finally
obtain
q+ =
1
µ
rp (1− γ)τR
[
1−
(
1− p
1−γ
)τR]
[1− γ + (r − 1) p]τR+1 (1− q−)
τR
, (12)
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FIG. 4: Phase diagram for an administrative body evolving according to Parkinson’s Law, Eq. 13
with γ = 0.01. The solid line (given by λ = 1) separates a regime of a exponential body (white
area) from shrinking growth (grey area).
where µ is the ratio of promoted to subordinate staff µ = N
+(t)
N−(t)
. Let λ be the growth
rate of the entire staff [N+ (t) +N− (t)] ∝ eλt. Parkinson’s Law then takes the form of the
eigenvalue problem of a triangular matrix
λ

 1
µ

 =

 a 0
b c



 1
µ

 . (13)
We find the eigenvalues immediately in the diagonal. This system allows one meaningful
solution for λ and µ, namely λ = a and µ = b
a−c
. For the other solution, λ = c, µ diverges.
We are finally in the position to answer the century, if not millennium old question how
a system of bureaucrats can be organized such that it does not grow exponentially. The
phase diagram in Fig. 4 shows the two phases, one of exponential growth, one of shrinking,
for administrative bodies evolving according to Parkinson’s Law. The line separating these
two phases (given by λ = 1) shows how the parameters r (number of subordinates) and
p (average promotion probability) should be adjusted to keep the size of the bureaucracy
constant (drop-out rate was set to γ = 0.01).
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TABLE I: Stages of efficiency of an official. He enters at stage 1. After the respective number of
years in service (number in brackets next to Parkinson’s Coding) he advances to the next stage.
If he does not reach a promoted position by reaching stage 6, he will enter the career described
by the right column. We also show the values of the efficiency for official i, ǫi, we assign to each
stage.
Stage Parkinson’s Coding
(promotion at stage 5)
Efficiency ǫi
(promotion at 5)
Parkinson’s Coding
(no promotion)
Efficiency ǫi
(no promotion)
1 Age of Qualification (0) 0.1 – 0.1
2 Age of Discretion (3) 0.2 – 0.2
3 Age of Promotion (10) 0.3 – 0.3
4 Age of Responsibility (15) 0.4 – 0.4
5 Age of Authority (18) 0.5 – 0.5
6 Age of Achievement (25) 0.6 Age of Frustration (25) 0.4
7 Age of Distinction (34) 0.7 Age of Jealousy (34) 0.3
8 Age of Dignity (40) 0.8 Age of Resignation (38) 0.2
9 Age of Wisdom (43) 0.9 Age of Oblivion (43) 0.1
10 Age of Obstruction (50) 0.0 – 0.1
IV. AGE OF RETIREMENT
To fully understand Parkinsonian growth of administrations we now determine the age of
retirement τR. Parkinson suggests that the optimal value for τR has to be found on the basis
of an administrative body’s promotion scheme. The age of retirement thus does not depend
on the actual age of the official whose retirement we are considering, but on his possible
successors which should be given the possibility to advance in their careers. If this is not
ensured a mechanism nowadays called ’Prince Charles Syndrome’ sets in, i.e. the official
gets frustrated by a lack of promotion opportunities, and individual efficiency decreases.
We assume the hierarchical structure of the administrative body to be built according
to the motif force that ’Officials try to maximize subordinates, not rivals’, i.e. each official
seeks to achieve a number r of subordinates. One can picture this structure as a pyramid
consisting of horizontal layers of officials holding an equally high office. On the hierarchical
level above there are then 1/r times less, on the level below r times more officials. Let us
label the levels in the pyramid by an index l, then there are rl officials at level l. If we fix
the number of levels to L we have N =
∑L
l=0 r
l and l ∈ {0, . . . , L}. We assign to each official
i an efficiency ǫi which depends on the years he has served and his current position. We
use the career stages given as in Tab. I, and assign an ǫi to each stage, increasing linearly.
These career stages are used as a tribute as in [1], but one could equally well work with
11
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FIG. 5: Efficiency of a Parkinsonian administrative body versus age of retirement τR. For three
values of ∆L (∆L = 1, green slash-dotted, ∆L = 2, red slashed, ∆L = 3, blue solid line) we show
results for systems of sizes L = 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 (curves from bottom to top). With increasing system
size the efficiency becomes size-independent. There is a unique maximum which position depends
on ∆L for τR.
other efficiency curves. The only important feature is the existence of a bifurcation point
reflecting the age where the Prince Charles Syndrome sets in, here this is stage 6. At stage
1 we have ǫi = 0.1. For each subsequent stage (left column) it increases by 0.1. If after
reaching stage 6 the official i reached a promoted position his efficiency proliferates. If at
stage 6 we still find him in a subordinate position, his efficiency will decline by 0.1 in each
of the following stages (right column). We introduce the parameter L′ which is the lowest
level which is counted as promoted. The subordinate staff is then present on the levels
L′ < l ≤ L. The number of subordinate levels is called ∆L = L− L′.
We numerically study this system in the following way. It is initialized with randomly
distributed ages (and therefore efficiencies) and r = 2. One time step in the simulation
corresponds to one year. At each iteration each official ages by one year and his efficiency
is updated according to Tab. I. If he reaches the age τR he retires and his position becomes
vacant. One of his two subordinates is chosen randomly to replace him, leaving a vacant
position one level below, triggering a cascade of promotions. When the lowest hierarchical
level L is reached the vacant position is taken by a new official who enters the system at
stage 1. This process is iterated until the average efficiency in the system – 〈ǫi〉N , the
mean of ǫi over all officials i = 1, . . . , N – approaches a stationary value. Simulation results
are shown in Fig. 5. We vary τR and compute the average efficiency 〈ǫi〉N for systems of
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sizes L = 3, . . . , 7 and ∆L =1 (green slash-dotted lines), 2 (red slashed lines), 3 (blue solid
lines). For increasing L the system approaches a stationary state where the efficiency only
depends on ∆L. Accordingly we find three bundles according to ∆L = 1, 2, 3 with curves
for different values of L discernible. Curves of same color and style correspond to increasing
L from bottom to top. For each bundle we find a unique maximum indicating the optimal
choice for τR. For values of τR below this maximum officials retire too early to reach higher
efficiencies, above this point the Prince Charles Syndrome becomes a danger. We further see
that the flatter the hierarchy, i.e. higher ∆L, the lower the optimal age of retirement. Recall
that we defined the ratio between promoted and subordinate staff as µ = N
+(t)
N−(t)
=
∑
L−∆L−1
l=0
rl∑
L
l=L−∆L
rl
.
By re-labelling the summation index we can write this as
(∑∆L
l=0 r
l
)−1∑L−∆L
l=1
(
1
r
)l
which for
large L and r > 1 converges to
µ =
(
∆L∑
l=0
rl
)−1
. (14)
For large system sizes the ratio µ indeed approaches a stationary value. So ∆L determines
µ and the best choice for τR, which in turn can be used to compute the growth rate λ from
the previous model.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We quantified three famous, descriptive essays of C.N. Parkinson on bureaucratic ineffi-
ciency in a dynamical socio-physical framework. In the first model we showed how the use
of recent opinion formation models for small groups could be used to understand Parkin-
son’s observation – which we showed is still valid in modern data – that decision making
bodies such as cabinets or boards become highly inefficient once their size exceeds a critical
’Coefficient of Inefficiency’. We showed how this characteristic size arises due to finite-size
effects in the process of forming of coalitions in small systems. Parkinson’s Law states that
the growth of bureaucratic or administrative bodies usually goes hand in hand with a dras-
tic decrease of its overall efficiency. In our second model we pictured a bureaucratic body
as a system of a flow of workers through an administrative body. Officials enter, become
promoted to various internal levels within the system over time, and leave the system after
having served for a certain time, they retire. Within the proposed model we showed how to
compute the phase diagram under which conditions bureaucratic growth can be confined.
13
We thereby link Parkinson’s microscopic interaction rules to macroscopic properties observ-
able in administration and bureaucracy. It is possible to adjust the ’microscopic’ model
parameters – which are altogether observable and measurable –, the individual promotion
probability and number of subordinates, to control the growth rate of the bureaucratic body.
In our last model we assign individual efficiency curves to workers throughout their life in
administration, and compute the optimum time to send them into retirement, in order to
ensure a maximum of efficiency within the body, Parkinson’s ’Pension Point’. We implement
Parkinson’s observation that an individual’s efficiency declines if he resides in a subordinate
position for too long, i.e. the individual efficiency curves over time are characterized by the
existence of bifurcation points. This effect necessitates the need of promotion opportunities,
which can be ensured by two mechanisms here. On the one hand one can lower the age of
retirement allowing young workers to advance in their career faster, or on the other hand
one can increase the levels of internal hierarchy.
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